Comments (57)

TheraP wrote on January 18, 2008 10:18 AM:

"things are going to get worse for the White House before they get better"

The White House will be much better off with a new occupant!

litigatormom wrote on January 18, 2008 10:44 AM:

"No reason to believe the e-mails are lost"?

Sure. I mean, it could be that for two years no one in the White House sent e-mails. Or maybe they only used their RNC accounts. Which would mean the RNC lost the e-mails, not the White House. But it wouldn't be the RNC's fault if they deleted them after 30 days, because the poor RNC didn't know that no one was using the White House server. I mean, how were they to know that the White House wasn't archiving the e-mails that went through the RNC server. Just because they gave all the White House personnel RNC blackberries? And how were the White House officials to know that the RNC wasn't archiving their e-mails? I mean, it's not like they could ASK or anything like that.

No one INTENDED to lose the e-mails. Shit just happens.

Carolyn wrote on January 18, 2008 10:47 AM:

God's in his heaven, all's well with the world, right tony? Those emails were old, anyway. Yesterday's news.

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 10:56 AM:

The White House's "tenacity" is that of someone who lies so often to so many different people, he/she can no longer keep up with what lies he/she told whom, so all he/she can do is tell another lie to hide the fact he/she lied. What they are tenacious about is being desperately mendacious. The number of flagrant lies and cover-ups that came of the Bush/Cheney White House are going to be exposed after they are gone. And guess what they'll both do in response? They'll lie!

Political Sports wrote on January 18, 2008 10:57 AM:

I have been involved in IT for more than 20 years, managing major systems. There is no way this can happen without intent or complete incompetency (ha, ha). If they did overwrite the tapes, there was a conscious decision to do so. Anyone who is responsible in some way for this information would know that it should be saved, especially considering it is the White House. Even small businesses keep their e-mails for years in case they need it for reference. The person(s) responsible can answer the question in two seconds. If they have them, they should be able to produce the e-mails within a day at most. Anything else is criminal.

Johann wrote on January 18, 2008 11:06 AM:

I'm impressed! Henry Waxman is holding more hearings. Can we expect any results? From past experience, that is completely unlikely.

Voltaire wrote on January 18, 2008 11:13 AM:

Dude!

If they can't handle simple email, how're they going to handle the Democrats, I mean, terrorists?!

Sincerely though, what's the penalty for NOT keeping backups as dictated by law?

r€nato wrote on January 18, 2008 11:14 AM:

Political Sports has it exactly correct. If incompetence is their excuse, then they must have one of those 23 year old interns from Heritage Foundation running the WH IT operation, in which case it's a wonder their computers work at all.

RobertSeattle wrote on January 18, 2008 11:33 AM:

I just wish the White House Backup IT guy could come out and say, "Yeah - it was pretty weird - one day the chief of staff came into my office and INSISTED we started backing up OVER the tapes from 2003. The guy never cared one bit about my backup process prior to that."

Mark wrote on January 18, 2008 11:54 AM:

Yeah great, Waxman and Conyers hold hearings. Do they do anything else?

Something that keeps bugging me. This is not some 1980s hacker movie ... constant reference to 'tapes', though wonderfully Watergate-esque misses the point that backups go to disk and, in particular, optical media now. Much more reliable, and you can't overwrite optical, in most cases, once written.

SO, I think it probable that no damn 'accident' occurred, the WH is just stonewalling the existence of the backups because of what is on them. If they truly are gone, they were, by deduction, destroyed on purpose. It is a crime in either direction.

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 12:13 PM:

We still don't know the name of the IT Contractor that maintains the White House (OA) systems.

Why won't the White House provide the name of the contractor? Waxman has been asking for this information since August, after learning about the existence of a contractor in May 2007.

whidbeygrl wrote on January 18, 2008 12:19 PM:

As renato says............
If incompetence is their excuse, then they must have one of those 23 year old interns from Heritage Foundation running the WH IT operation, in which case it's a wonder their computers work at all.

oh please let that also be true for the IRS,,,

please please please....

disgusteddan wrote on January 18, 2008 12:22 PM:

Hey Everybody out there that sent email to Executive branch during time in question should forward a copy of them to Waxman. Then he will have "proof" of missing email. This especially includes elected officials. If you have an email they can't produce then there ARE missing email. Let the executions begin!

Roberta wrote on January 18, 2008 12:22 PM:

Mark,

Didn't you read one of their last versions of what happened? They erased the archive tapes so they could reuse them, claiming that this follows "best practices" for most businesses.

Every excuse is absurd on so very many levels. This is another case of the Buscheney attitude that the law is for other people. It's not even that they're above the law; in their minds the law is simply irrelevant since it gets in the way of their goals.

BTW, I have nearly every email I have sent or received since 1999, business and personal. It's not that hard to do.

Gord L. wrote on January 18, 2008 12:59 PM:

"oh please let that also be true for the IRS,,, please please please...."

Be careful what you type, whidbey --- the wrong keyword can attract swarms of Paulbots.

Mark wrote on January 18, 2008 1:00 PM:

Roberta,

You're right. What was I thinking? :o)

As you say, absurd on so many levels. I also suspect that the same White House office infrastructure (IT staff, phone system, building maintenance) persists from administration to administration ... can't someone from the Clinton administration describe how the email backup policy was maintained?

pseudonymous in nc wrote on January 18, 2008 1:07 PM:

"This is not some 1980s hacker movie ... constant reference to 'tapes', though wonderfully Watergate-esque misses the point that backups go to disk and, in particular, optical media now."

Nah, tape backup for disaster recovery is still common in server environments, because it's cheap and reusable. But the idea that it's 'industry best practice' to recycle all backups is bullshit, unless your industry is destroying evidence. Like I said, tape is cheap.

pseudonymous in nc wrote on January 18, 2008 1:11 PM:

" can't someone from the Clinton administration describe how the email backup policy was maintained?"

Someone posted about it at DKos. There was a problem with archiving -- that prompted one of Dan Burton's regular bullshit eruptions -- on account of a weird problem with a server upgrade. (The OS was case-sensitive, the code was written in the wrong case.)

But the DKos post detailed the safeguards put in place by the Clinton admin: safeguards that were ridden roughshod over by BushCo, from RNC BlackBerrys to mysterious missing email archives.

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 1:13 PM:

@Mark

Among other things, at least two Clinton-era legacy systems (one called All-In-One, the other I don't recall) are still sitting in the basement of the New Executive Office building under court preservation order waiting for NARA to retrieve and restore their backup tape
contents. This is not a joke.

And no doubt you're familiar with the ARMS automatic archiving system - the one that the Clinton Admin left in place but the Bush Administration shut down, with no viable replacement?

Jamie wrote on January 18, 2008 1:52 PM:

I think that in cases where evidence was clearly destroyed with malice aforethought, we should be able to assume the worst regarding what might have been in those emails and the burden of proof should lie with the White House to show otherwise.

For example, there were probably emails discussing the need to assassinate Pat Tillman before he came home and became an anti-war advocate. There are emails discussing outing Valerie Plame. There were probably emails discussing almost all of the criminal activities committed by these thugs.

They all ought to be facing a firing squad if you ask me.

illlich wrote on January 18, 2008 1:58 PM:

That's hilarious-- WHAT emails are missing? the ones you guys never saw in the first place? HOW do you KNOW there were any emails if you never saw them? (As if for a period of over a year the White House was using inter-office-post-it-notes and snail mail instead of email).

slb wrote on January 18, 2008 2:02 PM:

I've spent most of my career in IT as well, and "Political Sports" is absolutely correct: there's no way losing more than a year's worth of data was just a simple glitch. If it wasn't intentional, then it was incompetent to the point of criminal negligence.

I know which I would put my money on.

slb wrote on January 18, 2008 2:12 PM:

>> This is not some 1980s hacker movie ... constant reference to 'tapes', though wonderfully Watergate-esque misses the point that backups go to disk and, in particular, optical media now. <<

Not necessarily. I work for a financial institution (assets just shy of $1 billion); our primary backups are to tape.

Alguien wrote on January 18, 2008 2:24 PM:

Mark wrote on January 18, 2008 11:54 AM:
"Yeah great, Waxman and Conyers hold hearings. Do they do anything else?"

Of course the do! They also write (and send) strong-worded letters! [and an occasional subpoena that gets invariably ignored!] Welcome to the 117th Congress!

john galt wrote on January 18, 2008 2:49 PM:

"I was reaching across my desk to answer the other phone, the one way over in the corner when my elbow must have hit the record button on the tape back-up thingy, before I relized what I had done it was over a year later and possibly some things were erased!"

Dereck WH IT Guy

r€nato wrote on January 18, 2008 2:52 PM:

Tape is still used for mainframe data backups. As pointed out by others, it's cheap and you still can't beat it for storage capacity ratio to size/cost. Optical media, hard drives and flash memory are catching up but we're not there quite yet. Even if today they had a flash memory module which could store a terabyte of data, I'm guessing at least a few years would elapse until that technology filtered out into actual day-to-day usage in enterprise IT.

Charlie wrote on January 18, 2008 3:46 PM:

I'm just as turned off by this story as anyone else. I don't think they're retrieve anything and I don't think they'll be able to hold anyone's feet to the fire on the issue. But really, we've all been here the last 8 years, we've all seen what the patriot act did....so does this really surprise anyone? They can search our email and tap our phones for any information they may find useful...do you really think that means that they would share any information they have? Less than a year of this BS left....hopefully!

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 4:45 PM:

"transferring from Lotus Notes to Microsoft Outlook"

This is news: There was a _transfer_ within the _primary_ systems.

A. Who developed the transfer plan?

B. What testing was done on a sample of WH e-mail to ensure that the "transfer" would work; was working; and would comply with statute?

C. Before the "official transfer of the _real/large/full_ WH e-mails", what sort of preliminary review was done to verify: "Yes, this method we propose to use is going to work; and we can show these reults to validate that method; and we plan to store the data in this location; and while we are transferring data, we will continue to either store _new_ emails (Created _while_ the "transfer" was going on) in _this_ location, register, file, storage ststem.

D. While there was a "test of this proposed transfer," what was the _contemprarneous_ review -- by WH legal counsel, outside counsel, contracting officials, IT software managers, or technical experts within the WH Office of Administration -- to demonstrate: The _Commander in Chief's_ documentation during _wartime_ would be retained; that the existing method/proposed plan, would comply with statutory requirements; if there were any problems, what kind of intermediate "holding, waiting, or decision points" existed within this "transfer plan" to permit adjustments, and reworking as foreseeable problems occurred?

E. Why were "industry" standards deemed "suitable" for the _Commander_ in Chief; why were there not _specialized_ procedures to ensure that the _COmmander_ in chief's data -- during wartime -- was safeguarded?

F. What types of fiber optic system was available, could have been used, or was used to sample the data; or otherwise intercept -- within the White House, or between the WH/outside entities -- various data: Were any of the NARUS STA systems used to capture _any_ data sent between _any_ outside entity of the WH into the WH; has the NARUS corporation been subpoenead; has AT&T or other telecoms allegedly involved with the FISA violations been asked to provide coppies of any and all e-mails they may have interecpted?

G. Is someone asking us to believe that the "standard to review/intrude" upon AMerican citizens during this Global war on terror did _not_ include a legal review to ensure compliance with any standards; yet, we're asked to believe the same for the President's retention _during wartime_ of data: That it too had "no regard" for standars; test plans, verification; and there is _nothing_ by way of data sampling or test plans that would demonstrate that the _Comamdner in Chief's data_ during _wartime_ was adeuately safeguarded?

H. How does the above square with the Single INtergrated Operating Plan [SIOP] that is "supposed' to ensure there is in place a viable "reconstitution plan" and a method to "safeguard American leadership" should there be an attack: We had an attack on 9-11; supposedly a review; yet we're asked to believe in 2008, that there was a "Tranfser of data between _commercial_ software products, but there was no credible plan, method, oversight, or _anything_ in place to ensure that the _data_ that was required -- by the SIOP to continue operating the government -- was prortected, safeguarded, preserved, retained, or available to continue operaqting?

I. The above line of events would have us believe a line of non-sense: That someone "got it in their head" that the _commander in chief_ during _wartime_ would not have a viable data retention program, policy, or testing sytem; yet that "out of the blue", despite the "big threat of terrorism," there remained no viable plan in place to ensure _our own personnel, not terrorists_ would not be a threat to the _Commander_ in CHief's data during _wartime_: This is abusrd. We don't need to worry about AlQueda doing anything; we apparently have contractors working for the President who are a _bigger_ threat to the SIOP than the 9-11 COmmission foresaw, imagined, believed, or was concerned about. Where is the "internal risk management plan" that would _ensure_ that this type of _internal threat_ from "transferring" was mitigated?

J. Where are the records of the _external_ senders of data to the WH-EOP; and when did these _external entities_ safeguard their records of the WH-Counsel _opening_ these records? [Lobbyists are apparently able to get things done, but there are "no records" of that discussion? Unbelievable: Contractor-lobbyists then need to explain the basis for their reimbursements to the US government for work done on contracts. The President cannot help." Absurd!

harriett wrote on January 18, 2008 5:09 PM:

Waxman needs to NAIL someone for this, and allow the American people to vote for impeachment. Dems are afraid to do this, as it will disrupt the governing...well, they can't get anything done anyway, so if they want to win big in November, then Waxman, Reid, Pelosi, and others need to stop being NICE to these criminal thugs who smirk at their efforts to bring about justice.

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 6:59 PM:

- What, again, was the basis for the "urgency" to transition "all" the e-mail and/or files from LotusNotes to MS Outlook; and who is asking us to blieve that "They didn't know there was a problem with the transfer until all the data was gone"?

Transferrring data implies:
A. An original source; [Lotus Notes]
B. A pipeline that is secure;
C. A final destination; [MS Outlook]
D. A backup location to store the _already sent_ data/files/emails [Perhaps outside OVP-EOP, at a contractor facility; read-only LotusNotes files]

This means we'renot talking about a "backup to email while the email is created" but a "backup system to store the data whle the data is getting transferred.

- Why was data getting "transferred" through B, but also getting deltetd at A; yet it wasnot getting verfieid as stored/secre at either C or D?

That defies reason. Before one transfers data, one verifies it will have a secure home; then, as it is sent, one verifies -- before deleting the data from its original source -- that it is secure. Data was not "lost"; it was deleted from at least five [5] locations:

1. The pipeline it was sent through;
2. The external storage locations;
3. The original point
4. The storage point, awaiting confirmation the storage/new location was working
5. The intended final destination

This is not a "data transfer" problem: This is a "data destruction" issue which is much larger than the WH counsel would have us understand. They were _destryoing_ data _before_ they confirmed it was "secure" within the new platform. That defies reason; and hardly meets the test of a credible "e-mail transfer program".

For those who say it _is_ possible, continue reading; and here are some of the problems the public has: The stories we're hearingn are not consistent; and the scope of the technical challenge has not been clearly established; there's no basis to assess that the answers we're getting are reasonable.

Going forward, as you read this note: If, as we are _now_ asked to believe, there was a "transition" effort underway, then the "plan to do this" would exist; and it would have been implemented. The following lists many questions which should be known, and not require research. Rather, if there is "needed time to answer these questions," it means, most likely, that the WH lawyers are _still_ inventing a story; and they do not realize the nature of the technical solution makes their explanation problematic: There are many lines of evidence which "should exist" if this story is true; and if those 'lines of data that should exist" do not exist, then it's most reasonable for the _court- to conclude that these 2008 statements have been fabricated; and are not supported, as they should be, by contemporaneous meeting minutes, notes, training, planning, and other documentation.

A "transferring e-mail between lotus and MS Outlook" is a _much_ different explanation than "We lost the data on the backups." The inconsistent explanations suggest the "reason for the data loss" is evolving to match the evidence, not, as it should, the other way around: Explain what happened.

Let's consider "Lotus Notes" in the context of "transferring e-mail": The problem we need to consider, in light of the less than candid responses to date, is to consider: Was the _data_ more than e-mail; and was something more than e-mail getting transferred? Lotus Notes isn't only an e-mail system, but it is a small internet, allowing users/readers to post information from a location outside the WH; and all readers/observers -- anywhere in the world -- can read this data. The question needs to be asked: Have you told us the complete story on "What was getting transferred"?

- What technical problems, if any, existed with LotusNotes?

- What performance measures were used to say, "We need X-performnce, but Lotus Notes isn't giving us what we need"?

- Was there something occurring on a specific date that, if the data was not transferred, the LotusNotes contract would end, and the data would be lost?

Sharepoint

The moment we hear "Lotus Notes" and "transfer" to "microsoft outlook" this doesn't answer the question: "Was the data only e-mail; or was the larger data related to transferring files and all posted information between Lotus and Sharepoint within MS Outlook"?

- Was Sharepoint part of the transition effort?

- Who got training on the "platform within MS Outlook" that the data from Lotus Note was getting transferred to?

- How was it decided that the MS OutlookPlatform for the data -- either e-mail, files, or other things -- was suitable to address what was not desired in LotusNotes?

- What was the supposed urgency of transferring data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook?

- What was the basis for the decision to transfer -- on _that_ date -- the information from LotusNotes to MS Outlook; if the data was not transferred, what was going to happen?

If the issue isn't narrowly with e-mails, but relates to "all data files, not just e-mails", then we're talking a larger/different problem: The issue isn't e-mail storage/transfer, but a larger problem of: _File_ management.

Recall the time when this data loss supposedly occurred: When Plame-Libby e-mails were lost, this was in the early 2000s, just a few years after the internet took off. PDFs were starting to catch on not just as a file to present information, but as a means to quickly disseminate within private inter/intranets to showcase information, conference notes, and summary reports. Recall also, the problem during 2003 Iraq war invasion, the commanders were complaining that there were no official "written orders," but that the instructions from the WH-EOP staff were in the form of Powerpoint slides, easily transferred -- as designed/envisioned -- within Lotus Notes. We need a straight story on what platforms were involved; the types of files they were transferring: This will give us some insight into the types of technical training/backgrounds of IT personnel within the Office of Administration at the White House. This is important because knowing the "full scope of the problem/data they were transferring" would give us a sense whether they viewed the Lotus Notes-issues as a simple platform/software issue, or whether there was a larger program office assigned as a subcontractor under the WH Office of Administration.

- Are there any copies of the "missing WH-EOP-GOP emails" on any of the _external_ platforms which _external_ users getting access to LotusNotes may still have?

- When we talk about "missing e-mail" have we included also "files which contain e-mail-like communications" which external users outside EOP may have accessed?

- Was the LotusNotes system only e-mail; or were there file sharing programs?

- Who/what firms outside EOP-WH, not physically connected with the White House grounds, could electronically read these LotusNotes, make updates; or did they only have a "read only" capability, and were not able to make updates to the files and/or emails available through the WH Lotus Notes System?

- Was the "scope of the transfer effort" _only_ email; or were there "other files" in ppt, xls, pdf or other formats?

- Who was on the access list to LotusNotes?

- When were the passwords for the LotuSNotes accounts issued?

- Who kept a list of the accounts for central management?

- When someone left EOP-OVP who had access to the LotusNotes e-mails, what method was used to ensuer they no longer had access to the LotusNotes Account?

- Is anyone "no longer with EOP" still able to get access to the LotusNotes accounts?

- Where is the log of access-times by individual user for LotusNotes; and how is this monitored?

- How were the passwords for MSOutlook managed , for each question above related to LotusNotes passwords?

- What types of problems did WH/outside users report during the transition effort from LotusNotes to MS Outlook?

- How were the _reported_ problems of users related to the _anticipated problems_ discussed before transitioning?

- Was there any work before data transfer to ensure that the "problems users were confronting" were or were not addressed with the proposed solution?

- Whwere are the records of comments people were making about problems with either LotusNotes or MS Outlook?

- Where is the trouble-log (reports of problems within the WH Office of Administration); and how are the timecards/workloads of the IT personnel justified on an annual basis for purposes of manpower requirements?

- Is the "reported problem/trouble list" consistent with "industry standards"; or are the records -- related to this problem/failure-mode -- not consistent with industry standards?

Once we look at the above, we'll get a sense whether there was a bonafide datamanage problem; and whether the proposed solution was or was not going to address these "stated problems we'renow told in 2008". There is the chance the "failure modes" we're being asked to accept as true are being retroactively fabrictaed; and the data-problem are illusory. But, if the above falure modes are true, then there should be some recollections of _former_ WH counsel/staff related to the "problems/issues" of LotusNotes (going forward, before the transition); some reports of "problems during the transition"; and then subsequent feedback comparing [a] LotusNotes to {b]the MS Outlook product.

As with the US Atty-firing issue: If, as it appears, we're dealing with explanations that have been fabricated retroactively, then the witnesses will not provide comments that square with "We need to transition" or "We observed these kinds of issues". They're going to give vague answers; or their explanations about the "technical problems" are not going to be able to be replicated before the Grand Jury during a simulated use of either LotusNotes or MS outlook. It will take legal counsel _time_ to train the "former users" on "what was supposedly wrong," but during the demonstrations the witnesses will likely get confused between [a] what was really going on; and [b] what they've been told in 2008 to report as a problem.

- Which data on the LotusNotes files was getting transferred?

- Why was this data on LotusNotes transferred?

- Was there a reason for choosing MSOutlook over LotusNotes?

- Which contractors had access to the LotusNotes databases?

- Where -- in physical space -- is the computer system which housed the LotusNotes data: Was it only located at the WH; or was some of the LotusNotes data retained on separate servers wth _external users_ at geographically segrated sites?

If we're talking Sharepoint and "other than e-mail" data, then the issue of "transferring data between user A and user B" is an issue: A NARUS STA system could have been used to intercept some of this data.

- Did any of the external users, who had access to the WH LotusNotes files/data, ever report any problems getting access?

- How much data did AT&T and/or other telecoms capture related to data external users were using as it was shared wth other users connected with the WH LotusNotes system?

- Were any of the users on this access list located within 6 miles of the White House, in Maryland, along a central highway, at approximately the location of a private residence home of an outside legal counsel?

- Does the WH lotusnotes/MS outlook system record computer IP numbers accessing the computer/LotusNotes/MS Outlook data within the WH House?

- HOw do the _reported/recorded_ IP numbers, and user access times with passwords, compare with the _external data_ at the registeries/storage locations outside WH Control: On external platforms,other data retention locations, and places where these IP numbers were stored?

The above is designed to do one thing: It will test whether the access-modes we're told make sense; or whether, in contravention to WH counsel explanations, the IP numbers that were "on the lists of e-mail that were destroyed" were, in fact, appearing on data storage locations at the same time elsewhere. This will tell us whether, despite "loss of data," the computers supposedly on the access list were only available at _that_ time; or whether they were doing something else. The computer is either doing what the WH counsel says, or not.

If, as it could have been, this Lotus Notes-data retention issue was a larger effort, with many unknowns, then there would be several planning meetings _before_ data transfer to discuss: Problems with the Lotus System that were not meeting the WH requirements; a decision to transition to something; and a series of technical interchange meetings between the MS Vendor of Outlook to ensure that the issues identified were going to be resolved; and then a demonstration that the data files -- as transferred during testing -- would not be corrupted. This takes time, software engineers get involved, and there are several meetings to finalize a plan. This means: People were getting paid to travel, meet, discuss, document concerns, and then do some sort of activity that is measurable for purpose of payment. What should be requested, in writing, under penalty of perjury:
- Lists of the program manager/team assigned to do an assessment of the problems with LotusNotes
- A review of all funds to certify that the funds paid for the meetings were for bonafide discussions, interchange meetings, and trip reports/techncal documentation
- A list of the personnel assigned in terms of their education, certification, and resumees; and job evaluations
- Copies of the technical interchange meeting minutes which should have discussed: Legal requirements under the sttute; the issues with using Lotus Notes; and a basis for a decision to transfer from LotusNotes to MS Outlooks.

The point of teh bove isn't to get lost in the technical details: But to pinpoint the _exact_ dates that key decisions were made, views shared, and meetings conducted. This will help understand the scope of the perceived problem; and give a sense whether the size of teh team assigned was reasonable; or, if there are holes in this data, this may suggest the following:'
A. The story we're told now isn't whta really happened;
B. There were no meetings, as would be expected, to discuss LotusNotes Problems becuase the real issues were something else, at a later date
C. The timelines that "should" support the above interchange do not exist because in 2007-8 we're being asked to embrace as explanations timelines which were not real, not supported by real meetings, and there is no clear chain of meetings/data interchanges to warrant confidence that the explanations are consistent with the contemporaneous data-related concerns in 2002 gong forward.

Failure modes analysis
Let's take the govt's assertion as true -- that there was a "transition effort from LotusNotes to MS Outlook" as true. This would imply that there was some _perceived_ problem with LotusNotes that was not meeting the WH needs; and/or a _perceived_ benefit to transitioning to MS Outlook.

- What efforts, before "transitioning" were attempted to work with LotusNotes?
- What records exist of the "review of LotusNotes" relative to these peformance criteria?
- Are we being asked to believe that the data on Lotus Notes that was "lost during trasnfer" aslo included _all_ the planning notes related to "concerns" with the LotusNotes?
- where are the _handwritten notes_ of comments users had about LotusNotes; or were those "lost" as well?
- Which language within which contract outlined the basis for the "effort to transition": Was this a level of effort workload; or was there a _separate_ contract that outlined the "transition from LotusNotes to MS Outlook"; who did the legal review of this contract; when was this done; has a special master had the chance to review whether the "planned transition from LotusNotes to MS Outlook legal discussion" meets what a reasonable counsel should have done prior to approving the language within this contract?

- Do we really understand what "really went wrong," or is there a good chance the "story we've been told is a smokescreen": There's another reason for this problem.

Part of the problem with dealing with the EOP IT area explanations is that we're not, yet, clear what the real story is. If we were to take "their current explanation as true -- that they were transferring data", then that transfer should have been related to some concerns, views, or goals:

- Did they hope to do something better with MS Outlook that they were not able to do with Lotus Notes;
- Was there a problem with Lotus Notes that they hoped to address

Then we can confront the data-transission issue: Supposedly they "lost" data during a transition effort. If this is true, then, during the transition effort, there should have been some sort of checklist/checksheet -- developed during planning -- of technical performance measures they were watching. IT doesn't matter what they were, but there should have been something that they were watching before they said, "We can continue with this transmission."

Otherwise, we're asked to believe something absurd: That the _entire_ WH data/e-mail, with a single flip of a switch by _one_ person, disappeared. No way. The Wh data isn't designed to be so easily destroyed; but the opposite: It is designed to be _protected_. The moment someone says, "We were dealing with Lotus Notes," but they're talking _White House (President) data, we're talking a whole new ball game: That data isn't accessed by anyone. To get into the building, requires extensive background checks -- in theory -- and the people near those computers should have had a reason to be there, training, and some expertise on LotusNotes and MS Outlook.

If their expertise does _not_ match what would be expected of someone who is "transferring data from Lotus Notes to MS Outlook", this raises questions about the reasons we've been told about [a] what happened; and [b] why, in 2008, we're suddenly told, this isn't an "email" problem, but it is a data _transfer_ issue.

CFEs

When were Certified Fraud Examiners first assigned to the Investigation of the WH Office of Administration in re Plame-Rove

Let's assume, for the sake of argument for this point only, that the WH explanation is valid -- that the error occurred "during transfer": How has this "lessons learned about this failure mode" (whatever it is) been applied to the investigation/oversight of a separate issue: The CIA tape destruction: Does Congress have on staff CFEs to assist it in the inquiry [The video images may have been, in real time, captured on a computer; but could be similarly destroyed "during transfer" as was done supposedly in re WH e-mails. If the lessons have "not been applied" _despite_ Congress supposedly getting briefed on things, then we have to reconsider whether COngress has or does not have the necessary support it needs to review this.

Transfer team: TIMs with MS outlook; data exchange meetings with the users
- When were these meetings
- Where are the records of the concerns raised about the original issues with Lotus Notes

PDFs
- Were any of the LotusNotes files "transferred" on PDFs
- What format were the non-emails in?
- Was any Iraq-related data stored on the LotusNotes?
- WHich contractors had access to the LotusNotes lists, and how did they make updates to the PDF files used to plan support for the post-Iraq invasion reconstruction?
- Was LotusNotes and/or MS Outlook and/or MS Outlook Sharepoint and/or external platforms used to plan the Iraq invasion: Between WH-EOP, external contractors, and others; did the contractors supporting the WH planning ever access LotusNotes files which were transferred, changed, or modified with this transition effort?

COngressional oversight

The GOP wold have us believe going forward after 2003 with the Iraq invasion that they had "things under control," but we find out in 2008 that they couldn't manage a benign effort of "transferring e-mail." They can't manage Iraq; and they can't manage e-mail. They want _more_ power in 2008 to get _continued_ access to the WH? It's been going on 4 years, and they _still_ can't provide a straight story over what happened with the Plame-Libby e-mails; how can they possibly in four _more_ years implement a _solution_?!? We need a new crew: The problem is -- ongoing, going forward from today -- they're still there bungling around. Congress has the power to say, "You're out. Hit the road. We need some people who will plan and solve problems."

- What's the plan to review the performance of the contractors involved with the WH Office of Administration?

- Why, despite this apparent "bungling during transition" are they apparently still being used?

- Is the "new company" still employing the same people hired before the LotusNotes data was transitioned to MS Outlook?

OTHER DISCOVERY

Beyond those answers to questions above, the following would be helpful:

- Copies of the original documents, not copies printed in 2008, of the notes made on the printed LotusNotes user's manual of the IT department.

- Review by forensics to ensure that the _original_ copies of these technical manuals only have ink from pens from the 2002-2003 ink batches; and confirmation that the "ink on the original documents' is not from any pens or ink outside what EOP had access to in 2002-2003, when the "problems with LotusNotes" or "issues of LotusNotes not meeting the WH-EOP requirements were first disclosed/commented.

- Copies of the in class training notes the contractors working for office of administration made while attending the _original_ LotusNotes classes; and then the conference meeting notes where they met with MSOutlookVendors to discuss "why MS Outlook and/or Sharepoint" could or could not address the issues with LotusNotes. If this mens asking _everyone_ who previously worked with WH Office of Administration to review their notes at home, then do so. If the issues were real, at least someone in private industry, who previously worked for the WH most likely has copies of these notes.

- A summary file of any reported harassment: Have anyone working for WH Office of Administration been threatened with any lawsuits; or have there been any assertion made that, "Discussion of these technical issues with LotusNotes" could result in prosecution? Look for evidence that those with the supporting information -- either confirmation; or proof that there were on real meetings -- have been dissuaded from letting people see emails, notes, or printouts of the LotusNotes files before they were transitioned.

- Printouts of the LotusNotes files from people who have made presentations to DoD; or other Iraq-related planning that DoD contractors still retain. Cross check the list of people with the list of people on the LIbby Commutation Letter list, filed with the Court in re Libby: People entering the OVP, and getting access to the building, may be on some sort of contractor-connected system which has a read-only capability to the WH LotusNotes system: Do any of the people listed by name on the list of letters written to the court in support of Libby have any password listed on the LotusNotes or MS Outlook systems?

- PBS Frontline reports the video comments of former WH Counsel. Rendition and prisoner treatment were discussed. What kind of data transfer capability exists/existed within MS Outlook/LotusNotes for WH Counsel to get access to read-only files of summary reports of prisoner interrogations?

- Was the video capture system of the interrogations automatic download to LotusNotes; or were there files/images of the interrogations, including clocktimes, within the LotusNotes/MS Outlook/Sharepoint data storage/access systems?

Spiny Norman wrote on January 18, 2008 7:31 PM:

The folks that brung us Total Information Awareness say they've lost archived emails?

please...

Next comes the wrath of the geeks.

Anonymous wrote on January 18, 2008 7:52 PM:

We read this: "there was no intent to have lost them" as an _assertion_, but does _not_ answer: Was there any intent to _destroy_ data from the "other locations" before the data was confirmed as saved in the final MSOutlook?

Allegedly, most certainly, "Yes." How else do they explain: We sent data from LotusNotes, but didn't verify that the data we "transferred" was secure. Consider the problem:

1. They "sent" data,
2. It _didn't_ get saved/they didn't save; but
3. They deleted it from the original source _before_ we knew all the data we were sending wasn't getting saved; but to top it off
4. _Before_ realizing all thet sent data hadn't been saved, they deleted the _original_ data.
5. Then, they finally got their story together in 2008, four years late, but it still doesn't make sense.

The passage of time should clarify, not create more unanswered questions. Yet, wIth a non-sense story like this, it means the _original_ failure mode -- however it was described -- was unknown, unlcear; thus, there was no credible basis to transition from one system or another. An unclear problem cannot have a "clear" solution; indeed, it does not:They deleted data _before_ confirming it was saved. And they want to export this "model of governance" around the globe?!?

Said another way: A group of people who cannot give straight story about this in 2008 were in no position to say with any certainty in 2004 (?) "We need to correct _these_ problems." No, they didn't know what they were then; and their story in 2008, for years later, of what "they did" doesn't solve a problem; but creates more problems, and questions. It doesn't appear they have a firm handle on what went wrong; what problem they were solving; or what was going on. Thus, there is no basis to believe there is a bonafide effort underway to "transition" or "Transfer" anything: That decision, if it were real, should be linked with _certain_ plans; not, the opposite: still-vague-non-sense from Perino in 2008

The WH public statements suggests they do not understand the _nature_ of technical dat management; and are fabricating assertions that are contrary to the data management decisions/actions. The statements are not credible, appear designed to mislead, and appear to be information the WH Counsel and President and others in Administration know, or should know, make the current explanation less than plausible.

Recall, other White House Press Officers have been allegedly been giving incomplete/inaccurate information. Perino's assertions defy reason. Either she doesn't understand basics of e-mail and files; or she knows or should know these assertions are a distraction from a much _larger_ problem: AN alleged ruse by WH Counsel to destroy war crimes evidence, in contravention to GEneva.

There are no "holes" in the US laws. The only holes are in the President's _procedures_ which fail to fully implement Geneva: Both in managing combat forces; and in retaining data related to that combat-related activity: Prisoner management. This is not a data management issue: This is an alleged effort by WH Public Affair and Legal counsel to slow roll ICC adjudication of alleged war crimes. Someone realized that the asserted privileges -- executive, deliberative, or state secret -- would most likely fail. SOmeone, knowing these legal risks, appears to have said, "We have no option but to destroy data."

Perino's statements may be used in re ICC review of these issues: Alleged war crimes evidence destruction.

Actual IT GOV Contractor wrote on January 18, 2008 9:12 PM:

You folks have it well in hand. Please forward a copy to your local hearing-holding congressman as a primmer. Really.

Also, request what was happening to other records-based emails like hiring notifications, performance appraisals (gospel-like tomes of the government worker), meeting notifications, and budget documents. These things are prime requests for reconstitution when someone accidentally deletes it and you need a date/time stamp to prove personnel compliance. This all would have been discovered much sooner if the stories were true. Too much diversified business happens that must be found every day. It would have become public for other reasons, or restoration would have already happened much more quietly.

Also, the ideas of presentation of technology planning are very good, but the most critical would be the locations of the older backups before these "final" ones. Incremental backups happen all over, particularly with larger datastores. This isn't a tape or two, but many, many incremental backups.

Final reality check: who's going to tell a guy with a shotgun that you lost his emails (literally and figuratively)?

Regardless of who is in the leather chairs in front of us, we contractors are not stupid, nor poor technology planners. We don't secure contracts at the EOP (among others) by failing at basic file conversion planning, or working in direct violation of federal records-keeping law.

This time, blaming the contractors may bring it all home to roost where it belongs...

SqueakyRat wrote on January 18, 2008 11:11 PM:

There's no reason to believe anyone in the Bush White House has ever taken a crap, you know. Where's the evidence?

greenbird wrote on January 19, 2008 1:31 AM:

anon.,
you are impressive.
and probably immortal.

greenbird wrote on January 19, 2008 1:35 AM:

i'm in love:
"Actual IT GOV Contractor wrote on January 18, 2008 9:12 PM:

You folks have it well in hand. Please forward a copy to your local hearing-holding congressman as a primmer. Really. "

ya'll listening?

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 2:42 AM:

Let's remember that this is only half the story. The "sensitive" White House messaging was handled through an RNC-provided system. Apparently this was an open secret to insiders.

Karl Rove did almost all of his computing on this RNC system.

But is "unprotected" RNC enterprise architecture hardened against hostile foreign powers? Is the People's Republic of China bribing Karl Rove for state secrets because they have his full RNC email dossier?

Virginia wrote on January 19, 2008 3:31 AM:

Anon,

Better than immortal, you are pure INSPIRATION to everyone, mostly me.

Thank you! NAIL them suckers.

And as for KARL .. well, you know.

Mike wrote on January 19, 2008 7:49 AM:

How can we be sure that there wasn't critical national security matters that were left unattended as a result of the missing e-mails? Perhaps news about an imminent attack on our forces in Iraq, etc?

Administration officials (right up to the top) should be impeached on this basis alone.

What next? A terrorist attack will occur and we'll be told that they weren't able to respond because they lost the e-mails?

Congress should use all legal means to compel the Administration to respond and ask them about such scenarios because they will have no reasonable answer and their incompetence will once again be on display for everyone.

Ann wrote on January 19, 2008 10:46 AM:

I hope that Rep. Waxman does not limit his scope to just back up tapes - needs to be any copies of the emails. I don't know that the emails exist in some other form, but I do know this administration will play word games if the request for information is too narrow.

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 1:15 PM:

It can hardly be called "normal industry practices" to _delete_ email from the _original_ files _before_ confirming the new location is saving the data.

Also, saying they were "following industry best practices" doesn't mean they were _correctly_ following them; nor that they were _implementing_ them according to industry practices. Anyone can read a cooking recipie; a wise cook will remember to turn down the oven before the house burns down.

Perhaps the White House didn't get "the memo":

- Do not run with scissors in your hands pointed toward you;
- Do not run with pencils with the pointy end up;
- Do not make stupid public statements that invite more questions;
- Do not use legal counsel who make your legal problems worse.

The non-sense explanations form the WH counsels' office means a couple of things: They still, in 2008, have no credible story of what happened _four_ years ago; yet, they would have us believe they can be trusted -- in secret -- to tell us what is going on today in the world.

- How many of the PDBs, which contain clear issues, are still "problems" for thie President and his legal counsel to understand?

- This White House apparently cannot follow simply "industry practices" to convert e-mail (if you believe that was the problem) bewteen data formats; why should they be trusted with access to nuclear weapons?

- Given the Congressional _awareness_ of the "large problems, and confusion about managing simple data files in e-mail," is it not of _some_ concern to Congress that there are _larger, more copmlex_ issues related to larger Geneva issues which the President and others simlarly had unreasonable confusion, were similarly poorly mismanaged, and were also "explained away" using inconsistent explanations?

At some point, Members of Congress lose the credible defense of "Oh, we had no idea," and they become complicit -- through inaction, and alleged malfeasance -- for the underlying apparent _incompetence_ of WH legal counsel and the President in managing affairs of state through "e-mail"; and the Members of Congress should be _alarmed_ by the larger, more complex problems -- which the President has apparently no undersatnding, nor is able to brief to the Congress -- to credibly justify that he should remain President, much less Commander in Chief.

BIg picture time: The President, as commander in chief, would as us that he "can't manage e-mails," but he wants us to believe that he can be trusted with combat forces, secret use of prisons, secret use of wrire tapping, and secret use of warrantless interrogations. This defies reason.

Going forward, its time for the public to openly discuss: What is to be done when a US government shows it cannot manage/oversee e-mail; and they arrogantly assert, "Even though we're retarded, and cannot manage e-mail, we compel you to remain silent about FISA violations, war crimes, prisoner abuse, Geneva vioaltions, and other things."

Time for the civilians outside government in industry to get their heads together and discuss:
- Are we going to continue down this path of following people in goernment who are so incomptent that they cannot mangae e-mails;
= Are we going to trust them to "get it right" when it comes to something _marginally_ more complicated like introducting _solutions_ to the globale economic situation?

In the 1930s, the concern of the FDR cabinet was that the PhD would lose confidence, and lead an open protest of the US citizens against the US government. It's time for that discussion to start. These people are incompetent not just in managing e-mails, but in overseeing the larger issues. This defies continued support or confidence.

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 1:58 PM:

Some of you may be wondering, "What do we do," or "What can we do" or "Where do we go from here?" The answers are not exclusively for the Congress or US government to decide.

The larger concern -- above and beyond apparent incomptentence in handling "simple emails," and the implicit problem of, "if they can't handle e-mails why trust them with nuclear weapons" -- is the issue of: Where is Congress; how long have they known, or should they have known about this stupididty; and to what extent is Congress complicit in this failed oversight.

Some have asserted -- as if rewriting the Constitution -- that an impeachment investigation of the above incomptence is "off the table". THose days need to end, and responded with: A Congress that has "no time" to investigate those who have "not time to follow instructions about e-mails" have not demonstrated they should remain leaders. On the table:

A. Effort to Remove Pelois as Speaker

The GOP supported the Kucinich resolution. If the GOP is going to maintain "any credibilty" then it needs to support an effort to remove the DNC leadership, and clear the way for _that resolution_ which they supported. Unless the GOP leads -- with those in the DNC who have defied Pelosi -- and open debate to _remove Pelois as Speaker_, We the People have ample evience that the Congress is _not_ copmetent; and is reckless in conducting onversight. This President has "time" to bungle email; surely, Congress as "time" to review his bungling on email, otherwise they fail to explain why anyone should follow him into more complicated areas like economic recovery or combat operations.

B. House Rule 603

Outside Congress, Vermont's Senate has passed a resolution calling on the US Congress to investigate/impeach the President. Today's revelations -- that the President cannot manage e-mails -- is ample evidence to ask: "If the Congress will not act to explore these implications of failed oversight in re e-mails, they must be _told_ by the State legislatures to do what should be obvrious: Oversee this President through an impeachment investigation."

Work with your friends to expand the effort to pass these proclamations. History will review whether the American citizenry did all it could -- outside Congress -- to investigate the "incompetent peole who cannot manage e-mails; and their implicity incomptence in handling slightly more complicated things like combat operations and economic recovery."

We've seen many lines of evidence supporting the assertion that the Congress -- like the President -- is not competent. It is time for the House Rule 603 effort to expand. Continue with that.

C. State AG Direct Prosecution of A Sitting President

Jonathan Turley, a Law professor at Georgetown University in 2000 wrote "Pillar to Post", how a sitting President can be prosecuted outside impeachment, otuside Congress. Vermont citizens have also led the way in discussing passing resolutions to have the President _arrested_ if he ever enters Vermont.

It's time for the _States_ outside Congress to work with their State Attorney GEnerals; discuss the prosecution efforts at teh state level; and follow Vermont's lead in discussing non-Federal efforts to prosecute this President. Congress has failed. The "inability to transfer emails" is sufficient evidence to justify removing the PResident: The man who cannot manage e-mails, would have us give him unfettered access to nuclear weapons. Those days need to end.

REVIEW

TPMM readers and citizens,

Please consider the implications of these stunning revelations from the WH Press office: They would have us believe, despite their inability in the White House to "manage e0mails" that they should be trusted with power; that they should be followed; and that they should be trusted. No way.

Going forward, its time to openly discuss the implications of this failed leadership in the context of failed econmic policy; and the risk that uncontrolled combat spending in Iraq is driving up the deficit, and putting our nation's debt rating at risk. The public needs to work with the Chinese to see, at what point the Chinese will reduce their selling of US bonds; and return to the US capital markets. Perhaps that day has ended.

Unles we -- as citizens, We the People -- do all we can to challenge this incomptetnt COngress and President in overseeing this "problem with following directions in re emails" we'll only have ourselves to blame. COngress refuses to act. Then it is time for the pulblic to put pressure on the GOP and DNC to remove Pelosi as Speaker; continue with state-level efforts to pass proclamations calling on Congress to impeach; and for the State AGs to get pressure to open direct prosecution efforts to arrest and investigate the President outside Congress, outside impeachment.

This government has proven itself unwiling to solve problems. This example of "unable to transfer e-mails" -- if it is true -- is a stunning revelation warranting a wakeup call in Congress. The public needs to send that wake up call: Not just call for impeachment, but to credibly remove Pelosi, make way for impeachment, and assert power at the State level to check this failed US government. Leadership means solving problems, not turning a blind eye to this incompetenency.

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 5:45 PM:

Let's pretend the "we were transferring e-mails, and they were destroyed"-argument is true. Supposedly this happened on a specific date; it was a planned event. Recall also, there was in Congress the GOP in Control in 2004. Supposedly, during a "routine" activity, the President's e-mails are wiped out. Shocking.

- What did Members of Congress in the GOP think when their e-mails were not answered?

- Did someone in the GOP-White House say, after the e-mails were deleted, "Hay, you know that e-mail you sent us about the Iraq operating, we'll it's missing, could you resend it?"

Let's pretend the Congress, regardless the weather conditions, awoke to some "reality" in/about 2004 that there had been a "massive loss of data" within the White House. Curiously, the GOP was "upset" when they learned of similar problems within the Clinton Travel Office. Even the VP Gore's "problems with e-mails" may have sent a message, "Wow, we in the GOP have the same problem. Maybe we should do something."

It seems very odd: For a planned event, massive loss of WH e-mail -- which the Members of Congress would have to duplicate work to "resend -- that nobody in the Wh, GOP, or Congress though to put their heads together, have a meeting, and "discuss" the problem: The statute requires e-mail retention; but the WH -- in 2004 -- supoodely knew, going ofrward, that it would not be able to meet the statutory requirement.

- Was there no meeting between EOP legal counsel and Hastert to discuss this?

As with the FISA "let us violate hte law in secret, wink-wink, but Congress will do nothing about it", why wasn't there a similar "meeting of the minds" _when_ the White House cousel _first_ realized, "Oh, my . . .the White House made an error. We need a _waiver_; and _going forward_ from _this_ date (whenever that was), we need some sort of work around and change in the laws."

- Why is there no record, as there were with the FISA-waivers, for the WH-Congress agreeing _after_ the data was first _missing_, to waive the rules; change the rules; or do something, as was done with FISA?

The record suggests the opposte. There was no _timely_ notification to Concgress; there were no meetings, as would be expected; and there were no discussions to "change the law." They ignored the legal requirements expected of people in separate branches of government: To openly discuss a problem with legal requirements; and discuss, as they did with the FISA issues, some solutions. Silence.

Put aside the issue of "a government that ignores laws is not legitimate," and focuse on the simple issue the founding fathers asserted as a basis for establishing a Republic: That those in the District might become experts on the law, and not distracted by the day-to-day activities of farming. Today, we're asked to bleieve this US government, on top of the fact that it produces nothing of value except excuses, was "too busy" running around the country "farming" on lands it does not own; and "working" in factories it does not manage.

There is no other explanation: We have supposedly a "clear problem" which Congress either knew about, should have been told about, or was in the dark about; but some in DC are "too busy" with e-mail retention to do anything, not even discuss -- as they did with FISA -- changes to the law. They. Did. Nothing. What's their excuse?

Nuremberg established a rule: That, even after wartime, when there are serious war crimes, _after the fact_ new rules can be written to specifically prohibit things that should have been knoown to be wrong; illegal; or contrary to Geneva. All Members of Congress, through their 5 USC 3331 oath of office, swore to uphold Geneva; and ensure there wree not domestic enemies that were destroying evidence related to war crimes. Yet this crew in DC -- that, again, produces nothing of value except excuses -- would have us believe they were "too busy". Doing what? Not ensuring there was a solution to this "massive loss of data". Recall, in 2004-5 time frame, we're one-two years into the Iraq war. How is the Commander in Chief "managing combat" if he can't mange his e-mail? The GOP was silent. They're happey.

We the People are not required to forever toil producing food, working the factories, not creating wealth. The Housing and stock markets are off their high. Wealth is evaporating. The people in DC have no distraction of wealth creation: They are in the wealth/resource _consumption_ business, as the framers _intended_: So they can focus on governmance: Moving paper, managing records, and managing programs. It's clear this crew cannot -- despite being given leave from the farm to "focus" on data management, are unable, unwilling, or not interested in doing whawt they're getting paid to do: Oversee, and manage _data_ related to governance.

They have no excuse. We the People outnumber them. A government that will not enforce _written law_ has a problem: before the international community, Geneva requires enforcement of law, including evidence protection and preservation.

- When did the GOP staff counsel in Congress have a meeting with their peers within the White House about the supposed "known failure" that occurred during a "planned event"?

- Why was there no coordination on changing the laws, as there was with FISA, to remedy this problem?

- Why is there no record of anyone in Congress meeting to discuss _immediately_ after this "data was lost" what the impeacts were?

- Who, in Congress, after this massive loss of data, knew or should have known they would have to "resend" the e-mails?

- How long was this "resend the email"-policy known, but Members of Congress did not review this?

- Where are copies of the e-mails sent supposedly to Members of Congress saying, "Wow, we just deleted all our e-mails, can you resend them; and can you remind us what we were talking about?"

- How long have the former WH counsel known that e-mail was deleted during a "planned event," but they have no explanation they've provided to the DC Atty disciplinary board?

- What is the relationship of the DOJ OLC including in the MCA language that would defend US government personnel before interntaional tribunals; but they spent "no time" coordinating legal solutions to remedy the "massive loss of data"-problem?

This Congress and US government would ask that we ignore the principles of a republic; and pretend they were, despite no distrations of farming, that they were incapable of focusing on the simple issue of finding a _contractor_ who could do what the Congress is there to do: Manage data, lead, solve problems, legislate, and fully assert their oath.

- What are we paying these people to do?

- When do the Presidential candidates -- supposedly arguing they can "lead" the government -- have to say about this communication problem: Inability to communicate a known violation of the law; known problems with compliance; and known loss of Presidential e-mails?

This is not an isolated event. But a recurring failure of governance. We the People can reasonably expect, under this Republic, for something marginally resembling competence not excuses or malfeasance.

When the data includes e-mails sent during alleged war crimes, the principle of spoliage and adverse inferences says one thing under the precedents of Nuremberg: to what extent where Members of Congress reckless in not timely overseeing a credible oversight system of that data; and when did the WH Counsel and President refuse to fully cooperate with reasonable efforts to preserve alleged war crimes evidence?

If they have no answers, then it's time to stop asking them for answers. It's time to adjudicate these matters. Even with the potential risk of war crimes trials, that appears insufficient to inspire within them an interest of the oath, 5 USC 3331, Geneva, or the Founding Fathers. Too busy to farm so they are leaders; to busy for leadership, now they are alleged war criminals. the ICC is getting closer to the "black cloud" surrounding the OVP's office. There is no statute of limitations for war crimes: Adverse inference are possible, just as new precedents at another Nuremberg.

Keep it up, US government. You fail to inspire; you make excuses for incompetence. Time for the We the People to sweep this incompetence from the District and return America to the rule of law, not arrogance nor defiance of civility. These are more than issues of data retention; they are issues of alleged international war crimes, malfeasance, the oath of office, and whether the Members of Congress can be trusted to fully assert their oath to defend _this_ Constitution. One option remains on the table: To impose on them a new system of governance, one that will compel, remove discretion, and clearly promulgate what competent leadership should well know: Lead, preserve, defend, and assert the rule of law, not the rule of incompetents through incompetence.

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 7:36 PM:

There's an option: Shut off the money. Pelosi has the power to zero-out funds; and it would be the GOP's job to add money back with an amendment.

WH IT area, since they have "no emails" have had "no data" to manage. Time for the IT contractor to give that money back for the data that they "haven't" been managing.

If WH Office of Admin will "not give the name" of the contractor, time for the Congress to shut off money. What's going to happen -- the President "won't be able to save e-mails"? He's already doing that. Not a "new situation". President whining, "But I'm the commander . . ": He didn't say, "I lost all my commander notes when this happened." It's too late now.

Time to shut the door, change the locks, and let the President sit inside the Executive Branch by himself. He alone is the only Constitutional officer the Congress is required to fund in the Executive Branch. He wants to be the unitary executive: Let him be in charge of an empty building, away from sharp objects, and no e-mail.

With this excuse of "Oh, we lost the e-mail," means: They've not been managing affairs. Cutting off their budget isn't going to change "anything". If it does, then they'll have to admit -- despite that "loss of data" -- they were still able to operate:

- What _other_ communication systems were used to prevent a "loss of continuity in WH operations"?

- Is there a reason these "other communication systems" -- which must have been used, as we see no evidence of a disruption -- have not been disclosed to the court?

- How could "all this e-mail get lost" _without_ any disruption of any Commander in Chief activities, programs, event, plans, or things?

- Where are the records,notes, private papers, private comments of former WH employees complaining about "all the e-mail work they lost" and how "disruptive this was" and "how all the e-mails they had disappeared, and this made their job (wah, wah) really hard?"

Call them on their bluff. They should have done many other things _immediately_ upon learning "about all this Commander in Chief-Unitary President data" was gone.

- How long did it take for the White House to get back to "normal operations" after "all that data was lost"?

- What types of discussions did the WH counsel have with Congressional liaision saying, "You know, we've got this war going on; but things are kind of crazy today. You know all those e-mails about our plans to expand the war from Iraq? Well, guess what: Funny thing happened today. They're all gone. Do you think you could slow down those news releases for a day or two. Our system appears to be eating things. Could you send a Fax to us?"

- Where are the copies of the FedEx/courier delivery/receipts from this period of "massive loss of data" and "use of back up systems" to send/receive emal "until we realize what went wrong"?

- How long -- after the email was 'deleted' -- did it take to "realize" that the data wasn't missing because of an "uknown" problem, but because of an "intended" action?

- Hw long -- after the email 'first went missing" did it take for the WH-EOP to "realize" that they were not under Electromagnetic attack (and no need to use paper/couriers), but this "loss of data" was because of a "human" problem?

- When did the "planned e-mail conversion" start (Time;date); when did the "first indication of loss of email occur" (time date) and "where are copies of at least _one_ email from EOP staff that said, in effect, "Oh, my -- all that e-mail we lost wasn't because of an electromagnetic attack, but becaues of our effort to conver email. Crisis over. No need to use couriers."

- Where are the records within NORAD that there were calls from the Joint Staff to ask about the "big EMP attack that just wiped out all the WH e-mails": Where were the calls asking about the extensive damage from the incoming missiles creating EMP pulses, radiation, and destroying all the email accounts around the globe?

- Why, when there was this "confusion" about what happened, were there not _immediate_ efforts by the Secret service to lock down the WH, move the President to a secure location?

- How long "after the data was gone, and we still weren't sure what happened" until the all clear, "We are not under attack; we don't need to use couriers; the President can be taken out of his hiding spot. It wasn't an attack, it was someone in the IT department."

- If there was no "concern about uncertainty," then tell us, "Who coordinated the deletions so that there was no surprise; no record of confusion; and no record of the Secret Service hiding the President?

- Where are the messages which were sent by courier, during this "confusing period" when "nobody knew what was going on"; and/or, "We still are not sure why the e-mails are gone, we need to use paper backup to continue operating"?

- Who was hired by Congress to send courier messages to the White House during this "oh, my we lost all this data, but aren't sure why"-period?

- How many messages had to be resent?

- Is there any evidence any outside contractor provided/resent _any_ e-mail during this, "Oh, my we accidentally deleted all our records"-period?

- If the e-mails were missing, then how would WH counsel know to go back and look at specific news events that they had previously discussed?

- If all the e-mails were "gone," how do we explain the EOP visits to web pages and websites about things that were "going on" during this period?

Surely, if "all the e-mails were gone" the EOP staff would have "no idea" what was going on, and would have "no reason" to discuss, review, or comment on any external website . . .

[Exhibit 1: For identification purpose only, this comment only: ]

wikiscanner.virgil.gr/

The wiki scanner will show the EOP is lying. When the e-mails were supposedly "deleted" this would have created a window of time where the EOP staff was confused, had no information, and had no idea what was going on. Yet, the external data shows us a different picture:

- EOP staff were stlil reviewing external data;
- There is no evidence there was a "massive" or a "sudden" loss of data
- EOP staff, were still, during this "confusing" period still looking at external websites
- There was no "Crisis" nor an "impact" to operations.

[Exhibit 2: Sample e-mail trace using IP numbers, targeted EOP ]

digicrime.com/iproute/root.html

[Exhibit 3: Some of the EOP IP NUmbers picked up by wiki scan:]

63.161.169.64,
63.161.169.65,
63.161.169.66,
63.161.169.67,
63.161.169.68.

Exhibit 4: The WikiScan of the EIP IP numbers
wikiscanner.virgil.gr/f.php?ip1=63.161.169.0-255&ip2=&ip3=&ip4=

Note the following in the scan: OMB in 2004 was making comment on the wiki.

- Where are the _documented_ e-mails, while the WH supposedly "lost all the emails" of OMB personnel -- on the dates listed -- saying, "We just lost a bunch of data, but we still have time to surf the internet."

What's really surprising -- on the date in 2004, just around the time of he "massive" loss of data -- OMB wasn't talking about losing data; they were talking about _policies_. Take a look at the OMB entries made in 2004:

QUOTE:A "stop-and-think shop," it is a senior management team of the [[White House]]. The OMB performs this coordination by gathering and filtering [[budget]] requests, and by issuing [[circular]]s dictating agency management practices, and reviewing agency [[regulation]]s. The current director is [[Joshua B. Bolten | Joshua Bolten]]. END QUOTE

- Where in this wiki update is anyone from OMB appearing to be "alarmed" by the massive loss of data? They're not. They're talking about Bolten, and policies. That's not concern with any event; it's merely spewing forth more of the alleged "policies" they were _ignoring_.

- Where is the OMB record-system related to this supposed "massive loss of e-mail": Look what EOP even said in 2004, still silent about the "massive loss of data,": OMB's job, according to the EOP staff was, QUOTE dictating agency management practices, and reviewing agency" _regulations_.

- After the "massive loss of data" what OMB records exist of a "review" of the "regulations" related to [a] preservation of data; [b] contract reviews; [c] compliance with email retention; [d] review of contractor activity related to data retention?

The problem isn't with the contractor or the IT area. There is not evidence of any EOP alarm, concern, or frustration with the "massive loss of data". EOP staffers were well positioned, continuing, and well understood their job: Review regulations. Someone knew, or should have known within OMB, that there were legal requirements which were not being met; or, the assertion "there was a massive loss of data" has been retroactively created.

REVIEW

There is no evidence supporting the WH counsel's assertions about "massive loss of data." There is no evidence that anyone was "concerned" about "gaps" in their memories; nor is there any evidence that this "massive loss of data" was "disruptive."

Rather, the EOP staff continued their normal _non official-related posting_ using government computers. That hardly suggests a crisis in data. IT suggests there was inadequate oversight to ensure EOP staff were _only_ using computers for _official reasons_.

This problem -- of real data connected to IP's not supporting US government assertions -- isn't just in EOP. Gonzalez as AG said the same thing: "We're too busy to process FISA warrants." Small problem: The wiki data says the same thing: On the very days DOJ would has us believe they were "too busy" to process FISA warrants, guess who was surfing the internet, visiting unofficial websites, and making comments _unrelated_ to FISA, official business? Yes, the very DOJ staff that was "too busy" to enforce or follow the 4th Amendment warrant requirement.

The big clue for the WH counsel in this "supposed massive loss of data"-explanation: Non of the data that _your_ peers has disclosed supports that assertion. Nothing. Zip.

- How does anyone explain during this "confusion of losing all this data" such a laxidasical attitude in EOP that staff were still surfing the internet talking about benign issues like "policies" and "OMB responsibilities". That's not panic, that's boring assertions of boring words which EOP staff wasn't following: _While_ they were talking about policies, they were _ignoring policies_ barring use of US computers for non-official purposes.

- Who is asking us to believe that there was a "massive loss of data" that "should have" caused "confusion";but the EOP staff was lazily surfing the internet, talking about boring things like policies? How absurd.

Arguably, the WH legal counsel and Press office have more than a credibility problem: They've supposedly made public statements -- out of court, that have been recorded -- that are wholly inconsistent with the electronic records which _have_ been preserved; and _are_ outside their control.

The WH Counsel and the White House public affairs office have no credibility at this juncture: Data defies their assertions. Their data, their assertions do not reconcile.

- What other things has WH EOP-Congress, in the "period of massive loss of data" also not done, secretly agreed to?

- Why was there a "mad scurry" to update FISA; but silence about "changes" to the WH e-mail retention policies?

- Why, during this "massive loss of data" and "reasonably expected confusion" was the EOP Staff still lazily trolling the internet, as if nothing unusual was happening?

The reasonable explanation is this:

A. The excuse of "we lost data on accident" is a fabrication; it was a _controlled_ loss of specific data; and the "loss of data" was not disruptive, but _consistent_ with policy that defied the Congressional requirements;

B. Congress was never "coordinated with on this" because the loss of data was not sudden, nor a surprise; but planned as an alleged effort to destroy war crimes-related evidence;

C. Members of Congress and the DOJ OLC well coordinated on MCA language providing for funds of US personnel defenses because it was _known_ that not all the data was destroyed; and the ICC could adjudicate these issues since 2001.

D. Despite the JAGs warning in 2001 of the risk ICC could prosecute, the WH Counsel believed it could hide evidence behind "state secrets" and "executive privilege" claims; only when they realized those claims might fail, did they wait after 2001 to allegedly destroy data in 2004-5, three years after the WH Counsel should have known _all_ data was subject to subpoena and should be preserved.

All other explanations ask us to pretend in chaos which is not supported by calm, measured, calculated postings of the EOP staff during this 'crisis'. There was no crisis of data; there was, and remains a crisis of leadership.

DISCOVERY

What's needed is the following:

- A written, signed restatement, under penalty of perjury, from WH counsel of the _specific_ computers which were "affected" by this loss of data;

- A listing of the IP numbers of _all_ WH-EOP-OVP staff that were "affected" by this loss of data;

- Explanations -- by each IP number -- why, during the "crisis of lost data" these IP numbers _are_ linked with non-official business; and there is _no_ evidence that a crisis existed, but the staff was talking about non-official activity using official EOP computers.

- A summary of all _Outside_ entities, including Congressional IP numbers of those "senders;/receivers of email that had been lost" of which personnel, e-mail accounts, and computers should have been "searched" to fully recover all of the "supposedly lost emails"

- A timeline of when the WH Staff did contact Congressional staffers in the _immediate_ wake of the "massive loss of data"; a listing of all Congressional staff computers which _were_ used to review all EOP Staff emails supposedly lost; and a copy of the "confirmed opened"-files which EOP and Congressional staff computers would have had related to this "effort to review the e-mails we sent, but were deleted".

- A sample of _Congressional_ emails discussing -- outside EOP -- that there is a "massive loss of data, that just happened" sent back CC: copy to the White House staff, in response to this "crisis".

- A statement under seal to the DC Disciplinary Board of how long former WH counsel have known about the above problems; and _real_ reasons why these "reasons for leaving the WH staff" have not been provided to Congress in secret. These need to be provided without any promise of immunity.

If there was confusion, that confusion should be obvious. Where there is no confusion, the asserted "Crisis related to loss of data" can only be one thing: An illusory story, retroactively created, and intended to mislead the public, court, and the voters. No calls to Norad because they weren't surprised. They knew what was going on; but there is no evidence of "confusion" which should exist had this amount of data vanished without notice.

They made the calls during 9-11. Why not make the same calls about the "massive loss of data"? Next time, they should write better timelines of "what to do" to make things appear real. Your plan must include _all_ the data; not just the data you thought you controlled. The data you need to back up your story doesn't exist. Tee data suggesting your are lying is available.

Al in Austex wrote on January 19, 2008 7:57 PM:

Actual IT Gov contractor wrote 18 jAN 2121 hours : "This time blaming the contractors may bring it all home where it belongs"
Gee IT Gov contractor maybe you & some others patriotic members of your team could maybe take whatever it is that you all have to the Waxman's staff. And if you can also make a duplicate package to Congressman Wexler - as he Wexler is leading the charge to have hearings on impeaching Cheney. And too, a duplicate package to the attorney general of Vermont , whom appartently also wants to impeach Cheney.
Come to think about it - there's probably a whole bunch of other stuff out there - like maybe copies of the illegal torture orders that were sent out by the OVP's office which I dunno - perhaps still have Addington's signature on them .
Moreover maybe theres another whole lot of other incriminating stuff that might show up as the bureaucrats, operatives , and private contractors figure out that Bushcheney will try to hang all these criminal acts on them & others- ( Remember that the only Officer to be tried for Abu Gharib was brought up on charges that related to his outting the ongong torture to the MSM -So whatever happened to the second phase of the General Tagube Inquiry for all that mess at Abu Gharib ? Anyone from Titan & the other private contractors better watch their butts when the ICC inquiry starts - might want to go ahead and get out in front of all that coming mess at the Hague )
Or could it be that probably Waxman has already got the "STUFF " that proves up that Bushcheney are criminals. And if I wanted to be as paranoid and as thoughtful as Anonymous is-- in questioning the complicitY of our Congressional lEADERSHIP -then I would pray to God & ALL OUR Founding fATHERS -that whatever "STUFF "is out there also gets sent to Congressman Wexler & to the Vermont Attorney General .
Now is the time for all Good Men & Women to come to the Aid of their Country -especially all the private contractors etc that Bushcheney want to hang with the Bushco crimes.
Mr jUICY -what do you and greenbird think about Congressional complicity - could Pelosi , Harmon , Conyers , & Waxman really be compromised and in support of the Bushcheney agenda ?

Anonymous wrote on January 19, 2008 8:44 PM:

Let's focus on this data, and compare it with the wiki-data. Here is a statement from Waxman, and focus on the _the dates/years_.

QUOTE: The White House possesses no archived e-mail messages for many of its component offices, including the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President, for hundreds of days between 2003 and 2005, according to the summary of an internal White House study that was disclosed yesterday by a congressional Democrat. ENDQUOTE

Combining [a] Waxman's view and [b] the WH assertions about the loss of data due to an e-mail transfer: Supposedly, "data was lost" _after_ 2005 during a "controlled e-mail transfer" of _only_ data 2003-2005. This may or may not be true; but we'll assume these dates for purposes of reviewing the data in these three segments, on a time scale:
Phase 1. 2003-2005; then
Phase 2. after 2005, when the crisis occurred; then
Phase 3. after the "implicit crisis"-period ended.

The analysis will show: By narrowing the "most likely dates of data loss" to a specific event, this makes the problem _worse_: Going to the wiki-link for the sample EOP data, we _don't_ need to worry about "what the EOP staff was doing in 2004 because that was "before" the crisis the email had not yet been deleted. Rather, we need only focus on _2005_: Again, we get the same results: _Continued_ posting before, during, and after "the date" of the "big loss of data".

Here's the wiki scan _only_ for _some_ of EOP: this says nothing of the agencies that "should have" aslo "suffered" an interruption:

Exhibit 1, for this comment only ]
See the WikiScan of some of EOP IP numbers:
wikiscanner.virgil.gr/f.php?ip1=63.161.169.0-255&ip2=&ip3=&ip4

What the wiki-data tells us, inter alia:
A. US government personnel did _not_ realize that their IP numbers were connected with non-official data;
B. US government personnel _were_ using official computers for _non-offiical reasons_;
C. The "amount of non-official use of resources" sheds light on the workload: They were so bored, not affected by any crisis, that they _had time_ to engage in _non official work_ during duty hours while working at official computers
D. There are records of US government computers being used _during_ the period when EOP data was removed;
E. The data disclosed at the wikis relates, or should relate to something "going on in the mind" of the President's staff;
F. The wiki information sheds light on information the staff were discussing, thinking about, reviewing, or contemplating: Giving us some insight into things that are no longer protected by any "deliberative shield", in that they've been disclosed;
G. GIve us a sense of the "volume of time-man hours" which the WH Staff _was_ able to use on _non_ official business because there was no crisis, nor urgency, and no massive effort to "figure out what was wrong"

Simply compare:
[a] the time window of the Waxman finding, that data was missing 2003-2005;
[b] assume that the "loss of data" must have occurred _after_ 2004, possibly in 2005 or 2006; and
[c] ask:

- If there was a "massive loss of data" sometime _after_ 2005, to affect data 2003-2005, why are there _growing_ piles of _non-official business as documented in the wikis?

- Why were personnel working for the President using computers for non-official purposes?

- How long have OMB or other staff known about this "overage" or "excess pool of personnel" that have not been productively used?

- Why is there data outside US government control that discloses things he President would ask are "deliberative", yet the data is not related to any deliberation, but _non official_ business?

- If there was a "massive loss of data" after 2005, affecting data 2003-2005, why do the data _outside US government control_ have _increasing levels_ of non-official use?

- Why should anyone believe that there was a "massive loss of data" when the wiki data suggests there was no confusion, or crisis related to _official business_, but enough time to engage in _non official business_?

We should have a curtailment of non-official use, as WH staffers and agencies have to replicate data; do more things than normal; and "remove themselves" from the activities they were normally doing that was "non official".

Indeed, if there was a _massive loss of data_, we should see a blip in the wiki data; but we have the opposite: An increasing trend. What "should" have happened if there was a bonafide crisis:

- In 2004, the non-official data use would increase at an exponential rate [which it was];
- In 2005, this should continue: Non-official use should be increasing as people learn "how to goof off at work, and not get caught" [ it was]

However, here is the problem: _After_ the 2003-2005 window, when the data was supposedly "lost", we should see a massive fall off of data, but we see the _opposite_: Data-entries continue to rise at their previous exponential rate. There should have been a massive fall off, while personnel were refocused on "the crisis loss of data"; and there was "no extra time". That _lack of data supporting a drop off of wiki-use_ is across the board in all Executive Branch departments and agencies. This evidence alone does not support the assertion there was a crisis; rather, if there had been a crisis, there would be too many unknowns to consider: We they under attack; what backups will we use; do we really know what happened.

Indeed, if the "loss of data because of a transfer of email"-excuse were true, it would mean the following:
1. While doing the transfer, they "wouldn't know" there was a problem;
2. "suddenly" the data would vanish, but nobody -- in a large organization -- would _immediately_ know what was going on;
3. It would take some time for the outsiders, not conneced with the IT area, to determine "we lost the email because of the transfer"
4. It would then take more time, after the data loss, to transition people, make calls, establish contact, and then repackage workproducts to get back on schedules.

This never happened. Rather, the wiki data this tells us a few things;
- The trends which are recorded within the EOP data on the wikis continued: Before, during, and after the "massive loss of data," as they should _not_ if the "loss of data were real".
- The expected fall off did not occur, because -- contrary to WH statements to the court and public -- there was no surprise, there was no requirement to "stop doing non-official things" nor was there a review of manpower to trnasition from the "party mode" [2003-05] to the "we need to reconstitute this data [after the 2005 window] and have no time for partying on the wiki"-mode.

Again, the point not to be lost: The data _outside_ the US government's control does _not_ support their assertions. In revealing _anything_ on the wikis, _those_ computers have disclosed either:
A. Evidence of non-official work; or
B. Evidence that "deliberations" were not related to a bonafide government interest

Both of the above are not protected, but FOIAS can get a waiver to the "deliberative shield" under the FOISA.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Do a complete review of _all_ WH, EOP, and Executive Branc data IP numbers to do the following:
- Identify which data disclosed in open media by IP numbers, has disclosed material information of interest to investigators;
- Review the disclosures to seek a reasonable basis to ask for waivers to the privilege;
- Review all the IP-connected data to determine:

A. Who was doing what;
B. What types of discussions _were_ they having;
C. How long OMB has known, or should have known about the "we do not have enough work for them to do"-problem;
D. Identify the scope of the data that has been disclosed, and would reasonably permit the court to conclude, "This has been disclosed; executive privilege cannot be asserted related to any discussions on this now-disclosed material";
E. Review to what extent the WH Counsels declarations of "this is a state secret' cannot be supported because the most likely, substantial reason for that protection isn't to hide a secret or protect national security, but to hide evidence of corruption, illegal activity, or unlawful use of US government resources for non-official business.

F. As you do this, know the DOJ Staff -- who is in charge of FOIAs, and can affect FBI/DOJ OPR -- is tainted: They too have done the same thing -- made disclosures about non-official business. If they lose this, they too are personally facing a problem: They could be liable for using official resources for nonofficial purposes. As we've seen with the US Atty firings, the EOP-OVP-DOJ-NSA have an interest in _claiming_ the information behind the data disclosed on the wiki is a "state secret"; but that assertion is not credible: The objective of the evidence suppression doesn't appear to be related to a bonafide concern with national security, but to avoid consequences for alleged illegal conduct. if they were serious that this is a "national security related issue" -- the data on the wikis and the disclosures-- then they should _not_ have commented _ever_ on these subjects. They did. Their problem: They didn't realize the Official computers' movements were recorded; nor did they realize that the "anonymous" wiki updates were linked to _specific_ people within the Executive Branch. As you can see from the wiki-data, this disclosure of IP-connected data has been known for many years; and the data has been analyzed showing the WH counsel's assertions are not supported by _their own data_.

G. Time for the DC Atty Disciplinary Board to get contacted in re alleged legal counsel frivolous statements to support alleged illegal activity: Alleged war crimes destruction.

They lost control of the situation when they allegedly defied Geneva. Their error was allegedly to ignore the JAGs going forward from 2001. The wiki-data supports the JAGs concern: There was inadequate attention given to Geneva. Most likely, legal counsel realized data could not be shielded from the ICC through privilege or state secrets claims. Even the backup/non-official e-mails were considered at risk of discovery. It appears WH Counsel knew, or should have known the data loss was in contravention with foreseeable legal requirements under Geneva, going forward from 2001, to preserve all alleged war crimes data, including the email within EOP, and the Executive Branch.

REasonable counsel should have preserved data; not, as it appears, asked us to believe non-sense that defies their own data. This is alleged war crimes evidence and should be safeguarded. There is no statute of limitations for war crimes for WH current or former legal counsel in re alleged frivolous legal arguments.

Al in Austex wrote on January 19, 2008 9:16 PM:

So Anonymous I saw over at truthout that former Homeland Security Director Ridge states simply that waterboarding is torture.
Are we beginning to see We the People starting to stir finally ? Former Gov , Congressman, Army Officer , and First Homeland Security Director Ridge , again I repeat has called water boarding torture.
Maybe other former heavy weights suchs as Sam Nunn, and Jim LEACH could get with the former JAGS about moving the politcal discourse futher down the feild toward accountabilty & IMPEACHMENT. We need to find our Howard Baker...
AND yes lets see if we can't get Madam Speaker either actively involved in Impeachment or actively removed from her position ...

Anonymous wrote on January 20, 2008 6:16 PM:

Let's focus on the "reconstitution" effort that "should" have happened had there been a "loss of data during transfer from Lotus Notes to MS Outlook." This does not presume this _did_ happen; only outlines a line of inquiry related to the WH disclosures. We continue with the following assumption: The assertion of a "loss of data occurred during a transfer of email from LotusNotes to MS Outlook" and that this statement opens the barn door to further inquiry: We will only later accept this assertion as a valid position if the WH accepts inquiry, and produces the following evidence that should exist to support their assertion: That data was lost during a "transfer" action. This note doubts this assertion is true: The WH cannot decide if data was or wasn't last during the "transfer."

As we proceed with this discussion, investigators may find it useful to physically map out the chairs, tables, and computer terminals within the EOP, Office of Administration, and other offices supposedly involved with the decision, actions, and reactions to the "events related to data transfer. This will be helpful when comparing reactions, remarks, comments, and responses of witnesses; and to present to the grand jury a mental map for them to compare whether the personnel responses were or were not consistent with their neighbors; and/or to what extent EOP/Office of Administration Personnel have been coached prior to giving testimony to the FBI, Congress, or Grand Jury. If, as we suspect, the timelines related to this "loss of data related to data transfer" are not consistent, the personnel actions should reveal inconsistencies as with the Plame-name leak investigation; and with the US Atty Firing.

FAILURE MODE

Prior to "data transfer," there would have to be a decision to transfer that data. The timing of this announcement/decision should be discrete. Once the decision was made to "transfer data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook", there should be many steps, actions, and responses of staff which should be consistent.

- Was the "planned transfer of data" coordinated with anyone?

- Who was involved with the decision?

- How long in advance of the "planned data transfer" did there occur any meetings, planning discussions, or reviews?

- Who was involved with the meeting?

- What was the lead time for this meeting: How far in advance of these planning meetings were participants notified?

- How were the participants notified: At meetings, via e-mail; where are notes from this meeting or to announce this planned meeting?

- Were these notes related to these "planned meetings to discuss transferring data" provided to the court, Congress, and FBI?

- When was the data related to the "planned meeting to discuss transferring data" provided to investigators, legal counsel, Congress, or the DOJ?

- What was the form that this data was provided to outsiders: Summary tables, graphs, screen shots of e-mails, meeting minutes, written notes, copies of notes?

- Were there any schedules ant timelines at the "planned meeting to discuss data transfer"?

- What software program did the IT department use to coordinate key actions, decisions, or events related to this "planned transfer of data from Lotus Notes to MS Outlook"?

- When was the decision to go ahead with this planned event: To transfer data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook?

- What tests were done before the failure mode was known?

- Which checklists, standars, plans, or other references were used to ensure your reviews, procedures, actions, and testing was consistent with "industry" standards"?

- ANSI standards?

TRANSFER ACTIONS

During transfer, we are asked to believe that there were some people who knew what was going on; and others, outside the discussion group who were not involved and did not get notified of the "planned transfer of data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook."

- What was the basis to include or exclude people from these meetings?

- Why were some people involved with the notifications of what was going to happen; but others were excluded?

- Could you point to the floor plan where the IT department is located.

- Please point to the locations of all people notified of the "planned transfer of LotusNotes to MS Outlook"

- When, and what manner were they notified?

- Does the information from these witnesses sitting at these locations confirm or rebut this assertion that they were or were not on this notification list of this "planned transfer of data from LotusNotes to MSOutlook"?

- Where were the EOP staff or others in the IT department when they first learned of this planned transfer: Were they at work, at home, reviewing their e-mail on a Blackberry; surfing the internet, at a staff meeting, riding the Metro.

- Which specific Metro line number were they on?

- Do they recall anything unusual about the weather on that day; any unusual events along the MetroLine?

- How far did they walk after they were first notified of the "planned transfer" until they arrived at their desk: Across town, across the office, from the lunch room?

ONGOING TRANSFER

This phase of the questions relates to the planned transfer of data. This phase is when data is getting transferred "per the plan."

- What pre-planning indicators were IT personnel monitoring during this transfer phase?

- What types of reactions were coming from the EOP Staff and IT department: Were they noticing any glitches with data, inability to access data?

- Which IT-indicators part of this "planned transfer of data" were or were not getting monitored; and how do these expected indicators square with industry practices; and with what was being observed?

- How far into the "planned transfer of data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook" did the IT department get an indication there was a problem?

- When did the IT department first learn "all the data had been lost": What time of day was it;

- What were the indicators that there was a problem?

- How far into the "industry approved standards checklist of actions" to transfer data "from LotusNotes to MS Outlook" were there indicators of problems?

- Was the checklist completed?

STAFF REACTIONS

This phase of the review relates to reviewing the timelines of what staff personnel were or were not working on; and when they were aware of a problem.

- When did the Staff, outside the WH IT area, learn that e-mail had been lost?

- When did the staff outside the IT area, learn that specific e-mails they created, accessed, or were sent CC:copies were not available?

- how long after the "planned transfer of data" did the staff learn the e-mails/data was not available?

- What are the electronic/IT_based logs of EOP staff attempting to access this data: Which attempts were made to open this e-mail that was "missing" or "not available"?

- Were there any links within LOtusNotes that were created to these original e-mails that no longer worked?

- Did the FBI, Congress, and Courts get a copy of the secondary e-mails/data/files which included links to these "missing" e-mails?

- were there any files that contained "links to missing e-mails" that were also missing?

Compare the following: [a] the time the original e-mails were created, that were missing; with [b] the time the subsequent e-mails were created that referenced these primary e-mails that went missing:

- Why were some e-mails that were "mentioned in these subsequent emails" missing; but others are still listed?

- Why are some of the e-mails that do include links to the "primary e-mails that were lost during transfer" created _during_ this transfer phase?

- Can someone explain why e-mails which include links to the "emails that were lost during transfer" include information which was not provided to the FBI, Court, or Congress?

- How was the e-mail, that was created _after_ the "data was lost" able to reference something that could not be linked to?

Here's the apparent problem: If we are to believe that this "planned transfer of data" occurred in a discrete window, then _all_ emails from that window -- when they were supposedly lost -- should not be mentioned in _subsequent_ e-mails. It is impossible, under the "we were transferring e-mail in a planned transfer" for that e-mail to be "lost" between a start-stop time on one day; but for other e-mails, created _outside_, after this window to reference those e-mails.

- How did the people who were creating these subsequent e-mails know about emails that were "lost"?

Here's what appears to be happening: The "window of time" when e-mails were "getting transferred" is asserted to be one time frame; but the actual "loss of data" was different, later, and under different conditions.

FAILURE OCCURS

This phase is the immediate phase after data is lost.

- How far into the checklist did the first data get lost?

- How far into the checklist did the IT personnel _learn_ that the data was lost?

- What is the difference between [a] when the data was lost; and [b] when the IT department realized what was going on: Was this days; seconds, weeks?

- How long (time units: seconds, days, weeks) after it was first _known_ the data was lost during this "transfer of data from LotusNotes to MS Outlook" did the IT department realize what was going on?

- HOw long did it take for the IT department to understand "their transfer of data" resulted in a new condition: "The data is gone": How long did it take to realize this?

- How much time passed before people were informed of the "loss of data"?

- Which e-mails created _during_ the planned transfer of data had to be recreated?

- Which specific seats/computers/personnel in EOP had to recreate data which had just been lost?

- How long did it take them to recreate this data?

- Were there no indicators to anyone in the EOP that there had been a loss of data within the IT area?

- How long did it take for the IT department to realize: We lost data; was this "awareness of a loss" immediate; or did it take many weeks _after the planned transfer_ for the IT department to realize there had been a loss of data?

- What was going on with specific projects that were relying on this "lost data": How were the workflows with DOJ affected; were there any records in DOJ OLC of any WH Counsel work products getting interrupted?

- Did the DOJ OLC notify the AG or secretariat at DOJ that there had been a loss of data within the WH EOP?

- What review did the DOJ OLC or Secretariat in DOJ make of all DOJ workproducts that had been prepared for the WH Counsels office?

- Was there no review of any DOJ workflows?

- How long after the "loss of data" did the DOJ OLC get notified that specific e-mails that were being worked on would have to be resent?

- Where are the records from the DOJ Legislative Liaision to Congress released to DOJ OLC problems with getting data from the WH EOP IT department?

- What was the timelines of notifications to Congress that there had been a loss of data within the IT department at the White House?

- What efforts were made to attempt to reconstruct this data that had been lost?

- Was all data lost; or were there some portions of the "attempted to be transferred data" that was recoverable?

- When was this data partially recovered?

- How were notifications to EOP-OVP-DOJ made that "some of the data were thought was lost is still available"?

- When did these notifications occur to inform non-EOP entities that the "massive loss of data" was not as big as feared; but they had, indeed, been unable to reconstruct portions of the data.

- AFter the data was known to be _definitely gone, and non recoverable_, what efforts were made to retrieve the e-mails for external senders; request CC: copies; or review blind copies to see if there had been other e-mails sent including this "lost data"?

STAFF ACTIONS DURING UNCERTAINTY

This phase of the review is between the "first detected loss of data" and the "confirmed loss of data." There would be a discrete period of time:
- IT Department would not yet know what happened, or why
- There were still efforts to troubleshoot to determine if the "planned transfer of data was or was not successful"
- EOP Staff would be attempting to access e-mail, but unable
- The IT Department would not yet be clear that the "inability to access e-mail" was related to the "planned transfer of that data"
- There was still confusion about why data was missing
- Those _outside_ the planning meetings would not know there was a "planned transfer of data" or that the personnel inside EOP could "not access data"
- There would be no official report of a problem
- Congress, the President, and the Courts would have no clarity that there was or wasn't a problem; or that there had been a loss of data

This phase is the "phase of confusion" where questions would occur; and staff EOP would be most vulnerable: They still would not know what was going on; the IT department would still be confused; and their data would not be accessible.

- Who spoke to the IT department about an e-mail they attempted to access, but were unable?

- Which e-mails created _after_ the planned transfer of data attempted to reference, link to, or connect with e-mails that were lost

- What were the screen messages at the terminals where the EOP staff were slowly getting error messages: What were the indicators of errors?

- How did the _reported_ error message square with the planned transfer of data; were any witness reporting specific error messages that were not consistent with any failure mode associated with a loss of data?

- Which error messages did WH IT get in this "phase of uncertainty" that have them wrong indicators of what was going on?

- What was the time between "first report of error message" (in attempting to access a lost e-mail) to the first indication/conclusion within IT that the data that was missing was, in fact, related to the "planned transfer": Minutes, days, weeks?

The lawyers responding to these FOIAS are not sufficiently competent in technical details to understand which questions-answers are related to bonafide indicators, or whether the fabricated responses would confirm there had been retroactive attempts to create an artificial timeline. It will be impossible to get _all_ the EOP staff on the same sheet of music, unless the "planned transfer of data and failure mode" was real. Addington and Libby were allegedly unable to provide consistent stories.

CONFUSION PHASE

This is a subset of the above phase, where we still don't know what is going on; but there is a confirmed loss of data. It's still not clear, yet, that the "loss of data" is connected with the "planned transfer".

- What indications were there that there was a loss of data?

- Was there no discussion that the "loss of data" was related to an attack?

- Was there no discussion that the "loss of data" was related to some sort of computer glitch, EMP pulse, or an attack on the IT infrastructure?

- How were these other failure modes eliminated as possibilities?

- What was the basis for the IT department to zero-in on on the conclusion that the failure mode was related to a "loss of data during transfer from LotusNotes to MS Outlook"; but was _not_ related to an external EMP pulse?

- How long did it take for the President to get informed of the loss of data?

- Did the President express any concern that the loss of data was related to a terrorist attack?

- How long after the "first indication of loss of data" outside the IT department, was it finally decided, "The loss of data is not related to any terrorism or threat to the PResident, but due to a planned transfer of data"?

- How much time passed after the "first loss of data" before the Secret Service was informed, "We do not have a problem with external conditions" and "there is not need to move the President to a secure, secondary location"?

- What items exist on the checklists related to Presidential protection that would, in this case of 'being uncertain why electronic data was missing," would warrant questions to the Joint Staff to coordinate with NORAD on whether there had or had not been indicators from the defense early warning systems that there was no attack?

- When were these confirming calls made?

- Do the recorded logs at NORAD documenting these incoming data requests coincide with the screen views, and displays on the monitors?

- What calls did NORAD make to the forward looking bases seeking information on the "potential of an incoming threat" or some Electromagnetic Event?

- What are the recollections of the NORAD staff during these calls: Was there no information that would help the IT department?

- What again - during this phase of "we're not sure what happened" -- would explained the IT department knowing for _certain_ that the loss of data was _only_ related to an _internal issue_?

- What was the basis to _remove_ external options as a potential source of the failure mode?

Here is the central problem: We're asked to believe that a White House -- that supposedly "can't run a checklist to transfer data, and didn't have backups of the LotusNotes _original files_ before deleting them, _would_ be able to zero-in on the failure mode. That defies reason.

Said another way, a crew working for the President that cannot follow simple checklist, and would _not_ have a backup file, would not be smart enough to quickly determine the failure mode. This asks us to believe they were too stupid to have a backup of LotusNotes _before_ deleting it; and _before_ confirming the files h